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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Overcoming global disparities in incomes and wealth requires that lagging coun-
tries successful pass through the process of structural change from being rural,
agriculturally dominated economies to more urbanized, manufacturing and ser-
vice sector based economies (Lewis, 1954). Such structural change is a stylized
fact of economic development (Chenery 1960; Kuznets 1966; Syrquin 1988), and
is required for productivity growth — the determinant of most of the diﬀerences
in incomes across countries (Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2010).
A global economic crisis, such as the most recent 2008-2009 crisis, can aﬀect
the dynamics of structural change and hence maintain or even widen global
disparities. A key channel is the behaviour of entrepreneurs during and after
ac r i s i s . 1In recent years the previously neglected topic of entrepreneurship in
economic development has experienced a modest resurgence (see e.g. Acs et al.,
2008; Acs and Szerb, 2009; Amorós et al., 2010; Gries and Naudé, 2009; Minniti
and Naudé, 2010; Naudé, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2010a, 2010d, 2010e, Naudé et
al., 2008). Herein it is increasingly realized that the role of entrepreneurship
diﬀe r sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent stages of a country’s development, and that the inter-
action between a country’s institutions and its entrepreneurs is an important
factor determining the country’s economic performance. Gries and Naudé (2010)
for instance provide a closed-economy model of structural change based on the
Lewis-model to illustrate that institutional weaknesses can create frictions in the
process where start-up opportunities are matched with entrepreneurial talent.
In this paper we extend Gries and Naudé’s (2010) model to an open econ-
omy setting so as to study the impacts of a global economic crisis on structural
change in a developing country. There is general agreement that the global eco-
nomic crisis which erupted in 2008 in the US’s sub-prime mortgage and soon
lead to the most dramatic contraction in world trade since the Second World
War, impacted on developing countries through a contraction in ﬁnancial mar-
kets and a reduction in export demand (trade)(Naudé, 2009b; 2009c; 2010b).
A growing literature has by now been devoted to this most recent of global
economic crises. It has focused on the causes of the crisis (Barth, 2008; Felton
and Reinhart, 2008; Johnson, 2009; Ritholtz, 2009; Stiglitz, 2009; Taylor, 2009),
the remedies (Claessens, 2009; Freedman et al., 2009; Ravallion, 2008;) and the
impacts (Friedman and Schady, 2009; Heady et al., 2009; Naudé, 2009,2010b).
There are still a number of gaps in the literature in terms of providing a com-
prehensive understanding of the crisis. One is that the current literature is
predominantly empirical, focusing on trends, costs, magnitudes of impacts and
forecasts of recovery. So far much less work has gone into broadening our theo-
retical conceptualization of the crisis vis-à-vis economic growth and change. A
second gap is that the relationship between entrepreneurship and the crisis has
been relatively neglected. Only a few papers have so far dealt with the fact that
a very important manifestation of the crisis is to be found in the churning of
1Entrepreneurial behaviour can also cause or contribute to a global economic crisis. Such
destructive entrepreneurship is not dealt with here but is left as a potential topic for a future
paper.
1ﬁrms-the failure of existing ﬁrms and the creation of new ﬁrms (e.g. Koellinger
and Thurik, 2009; Naudé and McGee, 2009; OECD, 2009). Even though the
crisis is now receding, the sudden changes caused in the nature and mix of
surviving and new entrepreneurs may have long-term impacts (Kedrosky, 2008;
Naudé and McGee, 2009; OECD, 2009 Naudé, 2010f). Moreover, how these
will aﬀect structural change and global disparities to come is still a relatively
unexplored topic.
Our paper, by formalizing the relationship between entrepreneurship, struc-
tural change and a global economic crisis therefore aims to contribute towards
these current gaps in the literature. The remainder of the paper will proceed
as follows. In section 2 we describe the salient features (or stylized facts) of
the most recent global economic crisis. We discuss how these may impact on
entrepreneurship, structural change and poverty. In section 3 we provide an
open-economy endogenous growth model to enable us to analyse the impact of
a global economic crisis on a developing country’s structural change through
entrepreneurial start-ups and innovation. In section 4 we ﬁrst use the model
in a closed economy context to illustrate how a domestic ﬁnancial crisis will
slow down start-up and innovation rates and structural change. We also show
how even in the absence of ﬁnancial integration there can be ﬁnancial contagion
eﬀects from an advanced economy crisis to a closed developing country. Then
in section 5 we use the open economy version of the model to derive a number
of comparative static eﬀects to study the impact and implications of a global
economic crisis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Global Economic Crisis
2.1 Description and Salient Features
As was mentioned the 2008-2009 global economic crisis resulted in both a ﬁ-
nancial and trade shock to the world economy. The ﬁnancial shock emanated
from the collapse on 15 September 2008 of the investment banking ﬁrm Lehman
Brothers - with assets of US$639 billion the largest bankruptcy to date in the
history of the US. Lehman’s collapse was the outcome of an unsustainable bub-
ble in US house prices which, in the absence of appropriate prudential regulation
and the illusion of perpetual price rises, resulted in the extension of mortgage
ﬁnance to households with little prospects of repaying their loans (‘sub-prime’
mortgages) (Naudé, 2010b). Between 2004 and 2006 these accounted for 25 per
cent of new US mortgages (Kay, 2008) amounting to more that US$1.3 trillion
(Lin, 2008). Banks covered up the risk by securitizing the expected income
streams from these bad loans, packaging them in with other securities such as
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). These were easily sold throughout the
world as they were given favourable (AAA) ratings by Credit Rating Agencies.
However by early 2007 problems started with growing mortgage defaults, fore-
closures and rising short-term interest rates. By mid 2008 around 40 per cent of
all sub-prime mortgages issued in 2006 were non-performing (UN, 2009). The
2subsequent deﬂation of a house price bubble and consequently reduced conﬁ-
dence in the US dollar contributed to a rise in energy and food prices (Khan,
2009). Oil and maize prices peaked in July 2008 at record levels, putting enor-
mous economic strain on energy and food importing developing countries (UN,
2009). By September 2008 the sub-prime crisis had become systemic and fol-
lowing the collapse of Lehman widespread panic resulted in ﬁnancial markets.
Weakened stock markets crashed and uncertainty about bank solvencies lead to
a global credit contraction. Losses in wealth, consumer conﬁdence and dwin-
dling trade ﬁnance was soon followed by the news that the US, and most other
advanced economies, were in recession. It would lead in 2009 to the ﬁrst con-
traction in global trade (of around -11 percent) since the Second World War.
Developing countries, most of whom had experienced robust growth since 2000,
all suﬀered signiﬁcant declines in economic growth in 2008-2009, contributing
to rising unemployment and poverty (Naudé, 2010f).
The sub-prime ﬁnancial crisis in the US was not the ﬁrst ﬁnancial crisis with
global repercussions (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Indeed, as Claessens (2009:
3) notes the recent crisis’ main features are very similar to that of previous
crises, such as (i) the blowing up of an unsustainable asset price bubble — in the
recent case particularly in house prices, and later in energy and food prices, (ii)
a credit boom leading to unmanageable debt burdens — in the recent case in the
sub-prime mortgage market in particular, (iii) an increase in marginal loans and
systemic risks, which was made worse in the recent case by the way sub-prime
mortgages were packaged and sold throughout the global ﬁnancial system, and
(iv) a failure of regulation and supervision — in the recent case witnessed by the
rise of the ﬁnancial sector, particularly of ‘shadow banking’, its growing political
power and inﬂuence over government in the US, and the various moral hazards
this created (Johnson, 2009; Stiglitz, 2009; Taibbi, 2009).
The responses of advanced (and some developing) economies to the crisis
have been unprecedented. Whereas the sudden onset and depth of this crisis is
in many ways similar to that of the Great Depression of the 1930s, it diﬀers in
the extent of the response, as a result of which short-term recovery was already
evident by the end of 2009. Fearing another Great Depression (1929-33) ad-
vanced economies applied all the lessons learned from that crisis by bailing out
banks (most were allowed to fail during the Great Depression) and announcing
huge ﬁscal stimuli (only monetary policy were attempted during the Great De-
pression). By 2010 recovery in most of the developing and advanced economies
was underway.
Having described the outlines of the 2008-09 crisis, a number of its salient
features can now be highlighted for purposes of this paper.
The ﬁrst is to note that the global integration of ﬁnancial markets, and the
increased ﬁnancial liberalization in which many countries have engaged in over
the past decade, lead to a rapid transmission of the sub-prime crisis across the
world — causing credit contractions all round. Amongst developing and emerging
country regions the worst to be aﬀected were the transition countries of East-
ern Europe and Central Asia. Countries with less globally integrated ﬁnancial
systems seemed to be less aﬀected. Hence the IMF (2009: 27) pointed out that
3African countries have had much fewer incidences of banks experiencing diﬃcul-
ties due to ‘the still limited though increasing integration with global ﬁnancial
markets, minimal exposure to complex ﬁnancial instruments, relatively high
bank liquidity, limited reliance on foreign funding, and low leverage in ﬁnancial
institutions’. However, even in such less integrated economies the US-centred
ﬁnancial crisis had an impact-many banks in Africa were reminded that the
US-crisis was due (partly) to inadequate bank supervision and capital require-
ments, and subsequent to the outbreak their surveillance and supervision was
tightened, hence reducing the availability of credit in their domestic economies
(Naudé, 2010c). This impact of contagion even on relatively ﬁnancially isolated
economies will be further explored in our model in section 4 below.
Second, the ﬁnancial crisis itself was manifested in a sudden reduction in
ﬁnancial wealth as stock and housing markets collapsed. It has been estimated
that between September and October 2008 an estimated US$25 trillion in wealth
was wiped from stock markets alone. According to Loser (2009) currency de-
preciations, declines in stock prices, losses in the value of private and public
debt and the eﬀects of depreciations on deposits could result in losses of more
than US$ 9 trillion in Emerging Asia and the newly industrialized countries over
2009-an amount equivalent to 109 per cent of these regions’ GDP.
Third, all countries — particularly in the West but also in the developing
world — incurred a huge cost in order to stabilize their ﬁnancial systems. Ac-
cording to IMF estimates, the costs of stabilizing banks, in terms of injections of
capital (bailouts), provision of liquidity, standby arrangements, and guarantees
of loans and deposits, amounted to around US$11 trillion in developed coun-
tries, and US$1.7 trillion in developing countries2. This has diverted funding
from other, perhaps more long-term uses, and has raised the spectre of unsus-
tainable accumulation of government debt across a range of countries.
Fourth, there was a paradoxical ﬂight to safety of funds towards the epicenter
of the crisis, namely to banks in the US and Europe, as a result of bailouts
and guaranteed bank deposits. Hence the credit crunch experienced by many
developing countries intensiﬁed.
Fifth, the general uncertainty prevalent at the beginning of 2009 and the
contractions in most developing country stock markets (of between 30 and 60
percent) lead to the costs of developing country government sovereign bond is-
sues soaring-as witnessed by the sharp increase in emerging market bond spreads
after September 2008.
Sixth, as advanced economies entered recession, their demand for developing
countries exports declined precipitously — and was worsened by contractions in
trade credit. The World Bank’s forecasted contractions in exports from devel-
oping regions in their June 2009 Global Economic Prospects imply an export
revenue loss to developing countries of around US$397 billion in 2009.
Seventh, reductions in advanced country GDP and trade, and the outﬂow
of funds to developing countries was exacerbated by reductions in FDI, ODA
2This is a huge sum for developing countries — about ten times the annual ﬂow of Oﬃcial
Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD DAC members in 2008.
4and remittances to developing countries. For many or the poorest countries
these are important sources of ﬁnance, including ﬁnance for starting ﬁrms and
covering working capital requirements. UNCTAD (2009) estimated that FDI to
developing countries dropped around 25 percent, even more in transition coun-
tries where FDI has been estimated to have declined by up to 40 percent. The
World Bank calculated that remittances to developing countries would decline
around 7.3 per cent in 2009, implying a loss of US$24 billion. And according to
the EC (2009) total ODA could fall by as much as US$22 billion in 2009.
Eight, whereas the credit crunch, uncertainty and more expensive debt re-
duced the general availability of credit in developing countries and raised its cost,
the expansionary monetary and ﬁscal policies used in the advanced economies,
and which few developing countries could match, led to a quicker recovery in
advanced economies, and for a return to easier credit for entrepreneurs in these
economies.
Finally, concentration in the banking industry in countries particularly af-
fected by the global ﬁnancial crunch—mainly as a result of smaller banks failing
but also due to larger banks being bailed out (being ‘too big to fail). Within a
year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the biggest banks
before the crisis (many of whom required substantial bailout money) have be-
come even bigger. Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo saw
asset growth of respectively 138 per cent, 51 per cent and 43 per cent between
June 2007 and March 2009. They are also ﬁnding it much easier to borrow than
smaller banks. By the end of 2009 banks with assets in excess of US$100 billion
were able to borrow at interest rates 0.34 percentage points lower than other
banks, while before the crisis the diﬀerence was only 0.08 percentage points
(Cho, 2009). The problem of concentration in the banking industry is com-
pounded by the similar concentration in related ﬁnancial services which should
provide checks and balances. Thus ‘the analytical foundation for much of the
global ﬁnancial system is now built on the paid-for opinions of just seven ﬁrms —
the big three Rating Agencies and the Big Four Accounting ﬁrms’ (Ely, 2009:97).
2 . 2 I m p a c to nE n t r e p r e n e u r s h i pa n dD i s p a r i t i e s
What do these nine salient features of the global economic crisis imply for en-
trepreneurship, particularly in the comparative developing country-advanced
country context?
At the outset it is important to note the importance of ﬁnance (credit) for
entrepreneurship. The general contraction in ﬁnance accompanying the global
economic crisis will therefore, ceteris paribus,l e a dt oar e d u c t i o ni nn e wﬁrm
start-ups, higher rates of ﬁrm failure, and slower growth, less investment and
employment, and productivity changes for existing ﬁrms. Economic theory
and empirical evidence support these expected eﬀects of a ﬁnancial contrac-
tion (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Cagetti and De Nardi, 2005a, 2005b; Evans
and Jovanovic, 1989; Gries and Naudé, 2008; Naudé et al., 2008). These eﬀects
have indeed also been documented in the case of the 2008-2009 global economic
crisis. For instance in the UK the amount raised by venture capital funds fell
5from GBP1,010 million in 2006 to GBP179 in 2008 and in the USA the number
of business bankruptcies increased by 54 percent in 2008 (OECD, 2009). Not
only will fewer ﬁrms be started up as a result of lack of access to ﬁnance, but
wealth inequalities will also worsen because only those individuals with access
to own wealth (and ﬁrms with suﬃcient internal ﬁnance) will be able to obtain
start-up ﬁnance. Hence the rich will be more able than say middle-class prospec-
tive entrepreneurs to start a ﬁrm during a ﬁnancial crisis (Naudé and MacGee,
2009). This itself can worsen wealth inequalities which in turn can further re-
duce start-ups — as Mesnard and Ravallion (2005: 3) point out ‘greater wealth
equality implies that fewer potential entrepreneurs are able to ﬁnance start-up
capital’. Thus, more binding credit constraints reduce the start-up rate, lead to
reductions in the average size of ﬁrms, and increase wealth inequalities.
Access to international markets — aﬀected by export demand and credit costs
and availability — is an important determinant of international entrepreneurship.
International entrepreneurship refers to the ‘discovery, enactment, evaluation,
and exploitation of opportunities-across national borders-to create future goods
and services’ (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005: 540). An important feature of
globalization has been the rise of international new ventures (INVs), which are
ﬁrms that internationalize early after their establishment (Naudé and Rossouw,
2010). These ﬁrms have also been described as born-globals (McDougall and
Oviatt 2003: 9 ). To the extent that a global economic crisis disrupts world
trade, ignite protectionist measures, and a retreat from globalization, it would
be detrimental to international entrepreneurship and speciﬁcally INVs. But it
is also existing international entrepreneurs that will be particularly hard hit,
especially since the ﬁxed or sunk cost to start exporting is high, and in the
absence of sustainable markets and trade credit many entrepreneurs will be
forced out of international trade. International sources of ﬁnance are important
for the start-up and growth of entrepreneurial ﬁrms in international trade, as
this provides funding that may not otherwise be available to produce for the
domestic market. Hence negative shocks to world trade-and world wealth-will be
particularly detrimental to international entrepreneurs in developing countries.
The eﬀects of a ﬁnancial and trade contraction described in the previous
paragraphs may be general — aﬀecting entrepreneurs in both developing and
advanced economies. However, due to the diﬀerent nature and role of entrepre-
neurship across the various stages of a country’s development, a ﬁnancial and
trade contraction due to a global economic crisis could also have a further round
of eﬀects that is more subtle, but still important as it will impact on structural
change and global disparities.
Ak e yd i ﬀerence between entrepreneurship in developing and advanced economies
is that in a developing (lagging) country or region, entrepreneurs are essentially
imitators when they introduce goods, services or markets that are new to the
economy (or ﬁrm) but not to the world (Szirmai, et al., 2010). Essentially they
adopt or absorb technologies from leading countries’ innovative entrepreneurs
(who operate at the world production frontier). Audretsch and Sanders (2010)
show how globalization has through global outsourcing contributed to this trans-
fer or know-how through entrepreneurial behaviour. A ﬁnancial crunch will
6negatively impact on both the ability of entrepreneurs in advanced countries to
innovate, as they substitute internal ﬁnance towards working capital purposes.
For instance the OECD (2009) reports that international patent ﬁlings fell from
an average growth of 9.3 percent between 2004 and 2007 to only 2.4 percent
in 2008. A ﬁnancial crunch will also limit their ability, through expansion into
foreign markets, to transfer new innovations. It is most often medium-sized
(middle class) entrepreneurs that innovate; the rich and the super-rich tend to
be less into innovative activities. If a ﬁnancial crisis / sub-prime crisis aﬀects
the wealth (and thus start-up potential) of middle class entrepreneurs more
proportionately, this will further acerbated the pool of low-innovation ﬁrms in
advanced countries (Naudé and McGee, 2009).
In developing countries, entrepreneurs (particularly indigenous entrepreneurs)
tend to be found predominantly in small-and-medium sized ﬁrms, for whom en-
gaging in international trade is a risky and costly, but also potentially rewarding,
endeavor. More and more small and young ﬁrms in developing countries have
been internationalizing at an early age in recent years (Naudé and Rossouw,
2010). A credit crunch and decline in export demand associated with a global
economic crisis will therefore potentially squeeze these international entrepre-
neurs from both demand and supply side. Because growth and public revenue in
developing countries tend to be more export-driven or dependent than in many
developed countries with larger internal markets, such a global shock will lead
to a disproportionally negative impact on entrepreneurial start-ups, interna-
tional entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial innovation in developing countries
(a major reason for entrepreneurs to absorb innovations is to be able to com-
pete internationally and with international ﬁrms — a global shock removes this
incentive).
If, in addition to these, advanced economies are quicker to provide relief in
the form of expansionary monetary and ﬁscal policies, entrepreneurs in these
countries could more quickly recover, with les permanent eﬀects, than in devel-
oping countries, where the constraints may bind for a much longer time.
Given, as we illustrate in greater detail in the next section, that entrepre-
neurs in developing countries are also diﬀerent in that they have an important
role in fostering structural change, then the implication of the aforementioned
is that a global economic crisis could be expected to lead to a reduction in in-
novative entrepreneurial activity in developing countries, in stagnation in low-
productivity activities, and a failure to structurally transform and catch-up.
Global disparities may be exacerbated.
73 Open-Economy Endogenous Growth Model with
Entrepreneurship and Finance
3.1 Intuitive explanation
In what follows we present a highly stylized and abstract model of a developing
economy consisting of a traditional (low productivity) sector, a modern sector,
and an (modern) international sector. In the modern sector there are a num-
ber of large, established ﬁrms (perhaps state-owned) run by mature manager-
entrepreneurs. They produce a ﬁnal output for the domestic market, making
use of human capital and intermediate inputs. The intermediate inputs are pro-
duced by small ﬁrms, and the outsourcing opportunities provided by the large
established ﬁrms provide opportunities for new entrepreneurial start-ups. These
opportunities, each one unique, can be taken up by surplus labour in the tradi-
tional sector. When taken up, a new ﬁrm is created that supplies an innovative
new product (new to the ﬁrm and to the country, but not necessarily new to the
world) and provides employment opportunities to surplus labour from the tra-
ditional sector. In this way, structural change from traditional to modern sector
is facilitated through innovation by entrepreneurs. When starting up a new ﬁrm
to provide an innovative intermediate product in response to an opportunity in
the modern sector, the prospective entrepreneur needs ﬁnance. This is provided
by imperfect ﬁnancial markets.
In addition to a modern and traditional sector we also have an international
sector. This is simply modelling as being separate from the modern domestic
sector. Here international entrepreneurs utilize global opportunities for export-
ing by using inputs sourced from across the world — they are part of global supply
chains (global outsourcing or fragmentation). To utilise a start-up opportunity
for exports in this sector requires ﬁnance — as in the domestic modern sector. In
this case, ﬁnance is obtained from international capital ﬂows — portfolio ﬂows,
FDI, remittances and even aid.
Assuming that the international sector is essentially an enclave and that
exporting requires foreign ﬁnancial ﬂows, we can expose this economy’s trade
fully to global economic crisis, but also retain the relative isolation of parts of
the domestic economy from international markets — a feature of underdevel-
opment, but also one which leaves less developed economies less vulnerable to
international ﬁnancial ﬂow and trade disruptions (Ravallion, 2008). A ﬁnancial
crisis will result in entrepreneurial activities in the international sector being
aﬀected through a reduction in credit, in an increase in reporting and moni-
toring costs, an increase in collateral requirements, an increase in uncertainty
of ﬁrm survival, increasing export elasticity due to increasing competition and
changes in the world risk free interest rate. Contagion from the international to
the domestic sector can occur when banks in the domestic sector become more
conservative and cautious in their own lending practices as a result of the crisis
aﬀecting the international sector.
Finally, our model has an endogenous growth setting which means that we
8look at shocks upon long-term dynamic processes. With this we can distin-
guish between long-term growth eﬀects and short-term instantaneous adjust-
ment eﬀects-as we do in sections 4 and 5.
Having described the salient features of our model intuitively, in the remain-
der of this section we provide a formalization starting with the modern domestic
sector.
3.2 Modern Domestic Sector
3.2.1 Final Domestic Good Production
In the modern sector of our economy there are at any given point in time a
number  of small entrepreneurial ﬁrms. Each produces a speciﬁc and dif-
ferentiated good or service as intermediate inputs for large ﬁrms in the ﬁnal
output sector. The latter produces aggregate ﬁnal output  for the domestic
market. These large ﬁnal-good producing ﬁrms are owned by domestic oriented
mature (established) entrepreneurs. Mature entrepreneurs produce with their
entrepreneurial and organizational human capital  and  intermediate inputs
 outsourced to the  small supplying ﬁrms. Because we place the emphasis
on start-ups and obstacles to their growth, the ﬁnal good industry of the mod-
ern sector is modelled rather simply. Speciﬁcally, we propose a continuum of
ﬁnal good producing ﬁrms supplying to a competitive ﬁnal goods market. This
feature may not reﬂect reality in many developing countries where markets may
not be that competitive. We leave the introduction of oligopolistic ﬁnal goods
markets for a future extension and for now try to keep the exposition as sim-
ple as possible. The production function3 for the representative ﬁnal product




() = 1− (1)
Mature entrepreneurs producing the ﬁnal good maximize proﬁts according
to the proﬁtf u n c t i o n =  −  −  with  denoting the price
of intermediate service  and  denoting the income compensation for the
entrepreneurial and organizational abilities of the mature entrepreneur. In this
model the mature entrepreneur is an organizer of production processes, more
a manager, than a risk-taker or innovator. For simplicity we also assume the
market for entrepreneurial human capital to be competitive. Using the ﬁrst
order conditions and normalizing  to one we can derive the demand for each
intermediate (service) input, namely
3This speciﬁcation of a production function originates form Ethier (1982). Similarly, Romer
(1987,1990) used this speciﬁcation to model technological change and growth, driven by newly
invented variations of productive inputs.
4Growth is driven by an expansion in N, denoting the number of small ﬁrms in the market








The human capital wage rate is obtained from the ﬁrst order condition for
labour
 =( 1− )
3.2.2 Households in the Modern Sector and Domestic Capital Ac-
cumulation
Only households connected to modern ﬁnal goods production will be able to
make explicit intertemporal decisions about savings and investments. House-
holds in the traditional sector and new start-up ﬁrms in the modern sector are
n o ta b l et os a v e .T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v eh o u s e h o l di nt h em o d e r ns e c t o ro w n st h e
modern sector ﬁrm and receives rental income from entrepreneurial activities
 and accumulated wealth. A household’s deposits are its only capital asset.
Thus aggregate capital income ﬂow consists of interest income from deposits,
denoted  . The budget constraint can therefore be written as
 +  =  +  =  + ˙ 
This shows that total income can be consumed or saved in the form of
deposits.
The intertemporal household decision problem is standard. The representa-
tive household maximizes a utility function with constant relative risk aversion.
The objective function is
max
()




Here  is the rate of time preference. We assume a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility function, i.e. 0()  0, 00()  0,
with Θ ≡− 00()0() denoting the constant relative risk aversion or the
reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Optimization results







Here  is the growth rate of consumption. In case of the CIES utility func-
tion, the semi-elasticity of deposits is constant and equal to the intertemporal




Θ A st h er a t eo fs t a r t - u p sd e t e r m i n e si n c o m e
growth in the production process, the household can achieve the desired growth







103.2.3 Entrepreneurial Start-ups in the Domestic Sector
Entrepreneurs are individuals who recognize new opportunities, as described by
Kirzner (1973) and Schultz (1975). In the present case, they may recognize
opportunities in the modern sector to produce new variants of services or in-
termediate inputs to large ﬁnal-goods producing ﬁrms. Each product or service
variation has certain properties that make the variation unique compared to
other already existing variations implying that the utilization of opportunities
requires some kind of innovation.
Start-up ideas and matching of business opportunities. In the modern
sector there are opportunities for successful ﬁrm start-ups. Potential entrepre-
neurs need to be able to perceive these opportunities, and be willing to try and
exploit them. This depends on their entrepreneurial ability, including as we
pointed out, their ability to innovate. With these start-up product proﬁles a
new start-up ﬁrm may match the requirements and conditions in the modern
sector market.
Start-Up of ﬁrms. In order to get the new service or product to the
market, an entrepreneurial venture, or start-up ﬁrm, needs to be created. This
is however, subject to start-up costs, which include costs such as initial capital
endowment information and organization and management costs, administrative
costs, costs of learning, cost of acquiring and developing a business idea (the
innovation) and a business plan suitable to obtain ﬁnance. Start-up costs are
denoted by . Asw em o d e ls t a r t - u pﬁr m sa ss u p p l y i n gd i ﬀerentiated product
variations their start-up is by construction an entrepreneurial innovation with
respect to the considered economy.
Operating the new ﬁrm. In addition to start-up costs there are recurring
costs to operate the business. These costs are denoted by  as costs per unit
output of the intermediate good. It has two components. First, there are costs
related to the speciﬁcs t a r t - u pﬁrm ¯  and labour cost. If the entrepreneur
employs labour at the given subsistence wage level ¯  and the labour coeﬃcient
is  =

 then the total wage cost per unit outpu will be  ¯ .S e c o n d ,
the start-up entrepreneur recruits from the traditional sector and relates his
entrepreneurial income to the subsistence income of employed or self-employed
¯  in the traditional sector by adding a proﬁt margin ¯  . Hence, his expected
income is (1 − )(¯  +¯ ).W h e r e (1 − ) is the probability of business
failure. This income is the minimum income the entrepreneur would like to earn
from his business. Thus total operating costs will be
 =¯  +  ¯  +¯  +¯  =¯  +(  +1 )¯  +¯  (5)
Due to these start-up costs, once a ﬁrm is started up it will remain monopolistic
for the speciﬁc service/product variation. As a result, each period’s proﬁts are
determined by the price of the product variation  and the operating costs ,
i.e.  =(  − ).The expected net present value of such a monopoly is
11 




where  represents the expected rate of business failure and (1 − ) the ex-
pected rate of success. Monopoly proﬁts are maximized by the optimal choice





where  is the elasticity of production of intermediates in the ﬁnal goods sector.
With the optimal price rule we can also determine periodic proﬁts. Each period’s
proﬁts is determined by the price of the optimal product variation (6) and the
periodic costs (5).N e tp e r i o d i cp r o ﬁts are given by  =(  − ) and hence


















Financing the new ﬁrm. Since the prospective entrepreneur is assumed to
have no immediate income or accumulated savings, the start-up costs  must
be externally ﬁnanced. The loan rate is denoted by . To simplify, we assume
a ﬁrm that revolves loans inﬁnitely and services interest only (Ponzi ﬁnance is







As long as there is no stationary state, start-up entrepreneurs realize a net rent.
However, in a steady state equilibrium the net present value of the new ﬁrm
will just cover total start-up costs which,  
 =  
 . Thus periodic monopoly
rents are eventually fully distributed as income of the entrepreneur and under
competition used to ﬁnance start-up costs. We can extend this to take into
account non-pecuniary beneﬁts of entrepreneurship (since entrepreneurial rents
are often found to be less than returns from wage employment, see e.g. Hamil-
ton, 2000) but for the sake of simplicity we leave this for future elaboration.
With respect to ﬁnancial markets, start-up activities by entrepreneurs lead to
a perfectly elastic loan demand
 =









Given that the ﬁnancial sector is often not very well developed in a developing
economy, especially an economy where there is a large traditional sector, we al-
low for imperfections in ﬁnancial markets to aﬀect credit availability to prospec-
tive start-ups. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) it is widely accepted that
informational asymmetries and agency problems can result in newer, smaller
ﬁrms ﬁnding it diﬃcult to access suﬃcient external ﬁnance, i.e. being credit
rationed (Bonnet et al., 2005). The problem of small ﬁrms being credit rationed
can be more severe if the modern sector is characterized by a high concentration
of market power by ﬁnancial intermediaries/banks. In order to model concen-
tration of market power in the ﬁnancial market we look at a number of banks
. Each individual bank  oﬀers deposits  to households and loans  to
potential start-up ﬁrms. With loan volume of  and start up costs of  to-
tal volume of loans so far has ﬁnanced the sum of all start-up costs over time P  and hence from a current perspective for the historically given aver-
age start-up costs ¯  we obtain the current number  = ¯  of existing
entrepreneurial start-ups that could have been ﬁnanced in this economy so far.
Banks have symmetric monitoring costs  for each deposit and ﬁxed costs as
fraction of GDP of ¯  for the internal institutional monitoring infrastructure of
t h eb a n k .I nt h es i m p l e s tc a s ew ec o n s i d e r here domestic banks issue deposits
for domestic customers. The expected proﬁt function of bank  is given as:
 =  (1 − ) −  () −  () −  (9)
where () is the deposit demand function and  denotes total deposits
in the region, and  is the expected default rate of the loans given to entre-
preneurs. The equilibrium deposit interest rate depends upon total deposits,
 ≡
P
=1  = . With the bank modelled as a pure intermediary, its
balance sheet can be written as
 =  (10)
This takes into account the number of competing banks as well as the semi-
elasticity of deposit demand 

1
 =  which in case of a closed ﬁnancial
system is 1Θ. As we assume that foreign investors do not blindly make invest-
ments (or extend loans) in the ﬁnancial system of the developing country we do
not need to unpack such ﬁnancial ﬂows. Therefore we obtain an domestically
determined optimal deposit-loan rate spread for banks as the solution to the
banks’ optimization problem




As can be seen from equation (11) an economy’s spread is determined by
two factors, namely the costs of monitoring () and the elasticity of deposit
demand as well as the level of bank concentration 


˜  = 1
 ˜ .A ni n c r e a s i n g
premium on foreign funding lowers the elasticity of deposit demand and widens
13the interest spread. In principle the level of  can have a range between highly
integrated markets with a highly elastic deposit demand up to a closed economy
where deposit demand is restricted by the domestic preferences  =1 Θ.F o r
present purposes we take  as pure domestic parameter.
As long as there are net proﬁt si nt h em a r k e tw em a ys e em a r k e te n t r y .
Hence, the zero proﬁt condition [ =0 ]d e ﬁnes the long-term equilibrium





3.2.5 Stationary Equilibrium in the Modern Domestic Sector
Combining the elements in the previous sub-sectors, results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The growth rate of the number of start-ups (and hence the sta-
tionary growth rate of the modern sector)
˙ 
 depends on two sets of parameters.
a) Characteristics of the real economy, speciﬁcally the start up costs  costs of
running the business  and the probability of failure .b )T h ee ﬃciency of
the ﬁnancial intermediation sector, described by marginal monitoring costs ,





















Proof: See Appendix 1.
3.3 Modern International Sector
In order to include eﬀects from international integration, both from exports and
international ﬁnancial transactions we deﬁne a modern international sector. As
mentioned in section 2.1 we keep the model analytics tractable by assuming that
exports consists of the production of intermediate goods as part of a global value
chain, exclusively for the international market, and that start-ups in this export
sector (international entrepreneurship, see section 2.2) is ﬁnanced exclusively
from foreign sources either as speciﬁc ﬁnancial investment in a ﬁrm (FDI), or
even through international aid inﬂows.
3.3.1 Foreign Traded Intermediate Goods:
The traded intermediate goods are described by the demand  for each of the
 =1  speciﬁc intermediates produced for further processing in an interna-
tionalized production chain. As international demand for each variation depends
on the price in international goods  the total demand for each representative




INVs come into being when entrepreneurs meet the need for an unique inter-
mediate input into a global value chain and obtain start-up ﬁnance from an
international investor (or donor). In most respects the treatment of the start-
up decision is similar to that of the domestic sector.
Start-Up of INVs. The start-up of this new variation again includes costs
of the initial capital outlay, denoted by .
Operating the INV. In addition to start-up costs there are recurring costs
to operate the business, denoted by  and consisting of costs related to the
speciﬁcs t a r t - u pﬁrm ¯  total wage cost  =  ¯  and entrepreneurial income
¯ .
 =¯  +(  +1 )¯  +¯  (15)
Once an INV is started, it will remain monopolistic for the speciﬁcs e r -
vice/product innovation so that each period’s proﬁts are determined by the
price of the product variation  and the operating costs , i.e.  =(  − )
The expected net present value of such a monopoly is
 





where  represents the probability of ﬁrm failure in the international sector,
and (1 − ) is the probability of ﬁrm survival. Monopoly proﬁts are maximized





∞    1 (16)
where  is the elasticity of demand for this product variation. In developing
economies we can expect that due to high standardization and competition 
is rather high, even when we assume that due to transaction and information
c o s t si ti sl e s st h a ni n ﬁnity. With the optimal price rule we can also determine
periodic proﬁts. Each period’s proﬁts is determined by the price of the product
variation (16) and the periodic costs (15).N e t p e r i o d i c p r o ﬁts are given by





















15Financing the INV. Since the prospective entrepreneur is assumed to have
no immediate income or accumulated savings, the start-up costs  must be
externally ﬁnanced. The loan rate is denoted by . To simplify, we assume a
ﬁrm that revolves loans inﬁnitely and services interest only (i.e. Ponzi ﬁnance
is excluded). Denoting the world risk free interrest rate , the present value of
start-up costs ( 





As long as there is no steady state equilibrium, start-up entrepreneurs realize
a net rent. However, in steady state equilibrium the net present value of the
new ﬁrm will just cover total start-up costs, i.e.  
 =  
 .T h u s p e r i o d i c
monopoly rents are eventually fully distributed as income of the entrepreneur
and under competition used to ﬁnance start-up costs. With respect to ﬁnancial













3.3.3 Foreign (Direct) Investments in the International Sector
To simplify, the international sector obtains its ﬁnance only from international
investors. These international ﬁnancial resources  are either ﬁnancial invest-
ments directly channeled into the export sector of the developing economy or
FDI. In both cases this ﬁnance is part of the international portfolio choice of
the lender. For a given amount of world wealth  af r a c t i o n will be allocated
into this developing economy as foreign ﬁnance. The portfolio choice depends
on the returns to foreign loans or investment  relative to the given return of
the world’s risk free international assets, 





We can now determine how many INVs can be ﬁnanced at any given moment.
Since the start-up of INVs depend on ﬁnding an international investor, we can
see the creation of INVs as the establishment of domestic ﬁrms that are being
ﬁnanced by international investments. Under competition the ﬁrm can pay a
return of  to any investor who either buys the business idea and pays for the
start-up costs as foreign owner, or just ﬁnances the start up costs as external
creditor. With the cost per start up INV we can derive the optimal number









3.3.4 Stationary Equilibrium in the International Sector
For a portfolio choice the optimal proportion of developing countriy INVs funded,
∗ depends on the relative asset returns of the real investment in the exporting
ﬁrm  a n dt h ew o r l dr i s kf r e ei n t e r e s tr a t e. Increasing return on investment
in INVs in the developing economy results in a growing number of INVs. For a
stationary structure of investments/loans the path of foreign funding depends
on general wealth accumulation in the world ˙ This leads to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 At any time the optimal number of INVs in the international
sector ∗
 is a function of the world’s risk free interest rate ,a n dt h ed e t e r -
minants of the return on investment of the INV, speciﬁcally  and ¯  .




 is a func-
tion of the growth rate in the world’s wealth
˙ 
 .F o r m a l l y
∗
 ()=











Proof: See Appendix 2.
3.4 The Traditional Sector
3.4.1 Lewis’ Surplus Labour and Poverty
The traditional sector is the surplus labour economy. In this sector people con-
sume what they produce at the subsistence level ¯ . The traditional sector is
assumed to employ a maximum of ¯  labour at the potential productivity level
1 hence labour surplus, deﬁned by the rate  = 
¯  , is not contributing
productively. As a result, average income in the traditional sector is less than
¯ , and surplus labour in the traditional sector is just waiting to get the op-
portunity to switch to any employment. However, this opportunity must be
provided somehow. In this model it is the start-up of a new ﬁrm, where either
the entrepreneur will utilize an opportunity for himself or even create job op-
portunities for others. These income generating occupations are the result of
a growing number of new start-ups  producing for the modern domestic or
international sector  and absorbing surplus labour   Accordingly,
 =  ( +1 )  =  ( +1 ) (18)
This indicates that our model corresponds to the basic idea of the Lewis
(1954) model. In the traditional sector ¯  is the long term subsistence wage,
and can be regarded as a poverty line. The poverty gap  in the traditional
17sector considers household income after it has been shared with family members
in the labour surplus pool. It is the percentage income realized for each family
member compared to the poverty line earned by ¯  employed in the traditional
sector.
 =¯  −
¯  ¯ 
¯  + 
The poverty gap in the traditional sector will decline as new jobs are created
by entrepreneurial start-ups in the modern sector, leading to a reduction of
surplus labour and an increase in average shared income in the traditional sector.
Both the domestic and international sectors absorb surplus labour. This ﬁrst
eﬀect helps people to leave poor conditions. Due to comparative advantages,
INVs may be particularly labour-intensive, hence encouraging INVs may be even
be more eﬀective for absorbing surplus labour than the domestic ﬁnal product
sector, consistent with the idea of export-led poverty reduction.
3.4.2 Current Conditions in the Traditional Sector
For the traditional sector we may determine the rate of absorption of surplus
labour and the changes that might occur during a global economic crisis. We
denote total labour by ¯  , the maximum labour employable in the traditional
sector by ¯  and the amount of surplus labour by  Now we can forward
proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The speed of the reduction of the surplus labor rate ˙  is a
function of the speed of absorption of labour by new start-ups in the modern
domestic and international sectors, and the speed of reduction of surplus labour










( +1 )− 1
˙  = −















=[ 1−  ()]
˙ 

Proof: See Appendix 3.
To understand proposition 3 intuitively it is useful to start oﬀ from the fact
that new start-up ﬁrms are the link between the modern sectors (domestic or
international) and the traditional sector. If infrastructure and market conditions
in the former are favourable creative and innovative entrepreneurs can draw on
the surplus labour from the traditional sector and provide a competitive and
innovative new input. While in the classic Lewis economy abstract capital
accumulation automatically generates jobs to absorb surplus labour, here we
include an explicit consideration of decentralized small ﬁrms.
184 Financial Crisis, Contagion and Structural Stag-
nation
T h e r eh a v eb e e nm a n yﬁnancial crises without accompanying trade contractions
or global systemic eﬀects. In such a case Gries and Naudé’s (2010) closed-
economy Lewis-type model of structural change and entrepreneurship provide a
useful tool to illustrate and model the impacts of a ﬁnancial crisis on structural
change in a developing country. For purposes of exposition, we therefore start
the analysis of the global economic crisis by using a graphical analysis to trace
out the economic structural dynamics of a ﬁnancial contraction as well as its
contagion eﬀects-particularly in an economy not ﬁnancially integrated into the
world economy. Then, in section 5 we analyse ﬁnancial and trade shocks in the
open economy version of the model set out in section 3 of this paper.
A core result of the Gries-Naudé model is contained in Figure 1, which is
also used to explore the impact of a ﬁnancial crisis, both when it originates
domestically, or from another country. From the Gries-Naudé model and the
presentation of the domestic modern sector in section 3.2, we can state Propo-
sition 4.
Proposition 4 If a ﬁnancial crisis results in (i) increased start-up costs 
costs of running a ﬁrm  and the probability of ﬁrm failure , and/or (ii)
in increased intermediation costs, speciﬁcally marginal monitoring costs ,o r
the costs of banks’ monitoring infrastructure ¯  , then the number of new ﬁrm
































W i t has l o w e rn e wﬁrm start-up growth
˙ 
 the reduction in the labour surplus









[1 −  ()]
 ()
˙   0
Proof: See Appendix 4.
To illustrate proposition 4 we consider increases in monitoring costs and
hence higher levels of bank concentration with the help of Figure 1. In panel
(a) of Figure 1 the banking sector’s eﬃciency is compared with the benchmark
case of a perfect market, represented by the 45-degree line. This loan supply
curve is upward sloping as a higher loan rate allows banks to pay a higher de-
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Figure 1: Increasing monitoring costs, and bank concentration
depicted as a horisontal line. This is because, as is reﬂected in (8) loan demand
from start-ups is fully elastic at the determined level  If ﬁnancial markets
are perfect, then the loan rate entrepreneurs are able to pay would translate
into an identical deposit rate for ﬁnancial investors. In case of imperfect in-
termediation the deviation from the 45-degree line would depend on the extent
of market frictions. Proposition 4 puts forward that both marginal costs and
bank infrastructure costs, increase after a ﬁnancial crisis, and both will drive
a gap between the loan supply curve and the perfect market conditions. This
imperpection is represented by the optimal interest spread (11). The gap can
also be due to increasing concentration in the ﬁnancial sector as a result of the
reduction in leeway possible for banks. The rise in business failures  during
a crisis provides a further motivation for more conservative lending by banks.
These eﬀects directly or indirectly impact on the parameters  and ¯ As a
result, in panel (a) of Figure 1, the loan supply curve shifts upwards to the left.
The result is an increasing spread and increasing bank concentration. In turn,
as panel (b) in ﬁgure indicates, the increase in the loan deposit interest spread,
in accordance with the Ramsey rule, the optimal growth rate is depressed down-
wards. Decreased access to ﬁnance as a result of increased bank concentration
and an increasing interest spread will further lower the start-up rate. At the
end of the resulting chain reaction the entrepreneurial start-up rate is lower,
with negative repercussions for structural change and poverty alleviation. The
resulting time paths for start-ups (innovation) and poverty alleviation are de-
20picted in panels (d) and (c) of ﬁgure 1. In panel (d) of 1 we plot the time path
of new start-ups. At the occurence of the crisis the growth rate of start-ups
will show a structural break with a subsequent reduced slope (reduced rate of
growth). In panel (c) of Figure 1 the eﬀect on poverty (through surplus labour)
is plotted over time, showing a decline in the rate of poverty alleviation to the
extent that new ﬁrm growth (and innovation) slow down.
5 A Global Economic Crisis and Structural Stag-
nation
In the previous section we illustrated a ﬁnancial crisis, in a domestic sector of the
economy. In this section we use the open economy model developed in section
3 to analyse the impact of both a ﬁnancial as well as a trade crisis, as in the
global economic crisis of 2008-2009. First we consider a ﬁnancial contraction.
5.1 An International Financial Crunch
In our open economy setting two features of the ﬁnancial crunch in particular
will impact on entrepreneurship, as discussed in section 2.2. We set these out
in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Following a contraction in world wealth   0,a n d / o ra n
increase in the long term risk free world interest rate   0 the optimal number
of INVs in developing economies, ∗








Proof: See Appendix 5.
Proposition 5 can be illustrated with the help of Figure 2. Thus, ﬁrst, the
crisis will lead to an upward adjustment of the expected level of the world’s
long-term risk free interest rate  as credit is crowded out by uncertainty,
bailouts and the accumulation of government debt. Second, the massive drop in
asset prices following the outbreak of the crisis will contribute to a signiﬁcant
reduction in aggregate world wealth. In Figure 2 both eﬀects can be identiﬁed.
In panel (a) an increase in the world’s long-term risk free interest rate  leads
international funders to adjust their portfolios, leading to a smaller fraction of
wealth allocated for international investment/loans for each given .T h er e s u l t
is that the number of INVs that will be supported declines per unit wealth as
a result of an adjusted portfolio structure. In panel (a) of Figure 2 this leads




 . Furthermore a reduction in world wealth further
reduces the funding of INVs indicated in panel (b) of Figure 2 through a shift
in the 
∗ curve. These two eﬀects reduce the optimal (desired) number of
INVs ∗





x N * () Wt 
*((,,) ,)
fw





number of firms 
before shock desired number 





















Figure 2: Eﬀfects of export, world return and wealth shocks on SMEs
the optimal number of INVs will be smaller than the existing number 0.A
portfolio adjustment of the existing ﬁrms towards the optimal number of ﬁrms
begins. This is shown in panel (d) of Figure 2. Closing down existing INVs
that have negative cash ﬂows could result in windfall losses. However, as there
may be a number of ﬁrms with positive cash ﬂows remaining in the market can
minimize losses. Consequently international lenders would not ﬁnance INVs
in developing countries until the desired number coincides with the existing
number. Hence proposition 6 can be states.
Proposition 6 A contraction in foreign funding of INVs will lead to a down-
ward adjustment in the number of INVs (∗
) over an adjustment period  and




.A sac o n -
sequence we obtain a stagnating surplus labour (˙  =0 )  and stagnating poverty







for period  =
ln( (0) − ∗




Proof: See Appendix 6.
22As shown in panel (d) of Figure 2, after the shock of the crisis the optimal
number of ﬁrms in the portfolio of international lenders is lower than the actual
number [  ∗
,s e eﬁgure 2 panel (d)]. Hence, international investors would
not fund additional INVs as long as the world wealth accumulation reaches
a level such that again the desired number of ﬁrms coincides with the actual
existing number of ﬁrms. Thus the negative impact of an increasing world
interest rates can eventually be compensated if world wealth levels recover over
the period . This could be a gradual or quicker process depending on the
extent and speed of global recovery. The longer it takes, the longer structural
adjustment and poverty alleviation will be delayed.
Figure 2 panel (c) describes the time path of the surplus labor rate and the
poverty gap. Both stagnates for period  Therefore poverty reduction as well
as the process of structural transformation will continue to be aﬀected well after
the immediate urgency of the crisis is over.
5.2 Foreign Trade Shock
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-2009 had an large impact on global trade. Since many
successful developing countries followed and export-driven growth strategy the
eﬀects of a sudden decline in global trade should also be analysed. Such a decline
reduces the demand for intermediates in the international production chain,
and increases competition between contributors in this chain. In our model
this is reﬂected in an increase in the elasticity of demand for each intermediate
product. As a result the proﬁtability of INVs declines and the rate of return
from international ﬁnance,  falls. International investors then adjust their




 . This leads us to
proposition 7.
Proposition 7 Ac o n t r a c t i o ni nw o r l de x p o r td e m a n dw i l ll e a dt oa ni n c r e a s e
in the demand elasticity of exports from the developing economy  (increasing
values of ¯  and ) and a decrease in the proﬁtability of INV, .H e n c e
the desired number of INV (∗
) to be funded by international investors for each
unit of wealth 













Proof: See Appendix 7.
The negative impact of a sudden drop in global trade hits export oriented
entrepreneurs in the international sector of the developing country. Higher
competition leads to a reduction in the internal rate of return .F i g u r e 2
illustrates the resulting mechanisms which are broadly similar to the eﬀects
discussed for the the change in the world’s risk free interest rates. The change
in relative returns aﬀects the portfolio decision [see panel (a) in Figure 2], and

∗ shows the eﬀect of portfolio adjustments on the optimal number of ﬁrms that
investors are willing to ﬁnance for a given level of wealth. The optimal number
23of ﬁrms in the portfolio declines and stagnation occurs until the number of
existing ﬁrms coincides with the optimal number of ﬁrms [see again panel (d) of
Figure 2]. The eﬀects on poverty reduction is similar to the description in the
previous subsection.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Our paper has highlighted a number of still neglected aspects of the global eco-
nomic crisis. First, we have provided an initial formalization of the analytics of
such crises in the framework of an endogenous growth model. Second we had
emphasized the diﬀerences between short-term and long-term impacts. Third,
in terms of the latter we have shown that entrepreneurial behaviour-through
start-ups of new ﬁrms and innovation-is an important channel through which
crises aﬀects longer-term structural change. This impact of crises are still under-
appreciated. Only recently for instance did the OECD (2009: 5) warn that the
impact of the global economic contraction through start-up and innovative ac-
tivity could be detrimental to structural change, stating that restrictions on the
entry of innovative start-ups and a slowing down of global knowledge trans-
fers, diﬀusion and adoption as a result of shrinking trade and ﬁnance could
negative aﬀect ’the ability of the economy to reallocate resources from declin-
ing industries to newly emerging industries and new opportunities’.The model
analytics identiﬁed a number of challenges for structural change and catch-up
in a post-crisis world, such as dealing with greater bank concentration, higher
costs of bank monitoring and stricter regulations and collateral requirements,
a ﬂight-to-safety eﬀect in global ﬁnance, reduced incentives for innovation and
job-creating start-ups.
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287 Short Appendix:
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
Using the Ramsey Rule from optimal household decision (3),t h eo p t i m a l
spread from banking decsion (11), and the return on capital and hence the loan
rate a new ﬁrm is able to pay (8) and the no proﬁt condition in the banking
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Appendix 2: Proof of propostion 2:
Portfolio decision for the value of international investment  in these INVs:
 = ( )
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A p p e n d i x3P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3
From the deﬁnition of the surplus labour rate  = 
¯  and the absorption of
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29If the poverty gap is deﬁned by  =¯  − ¯  ¯ 
¯ + and the subsistence wage is
normalized we obtain by rearangments
=
¯  ¯  +¯  − ¯  ¯ 
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A p p e n d i x4P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4
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A p p e n d i x5P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5







 , the the internal return of
exporting start-ups  (see 17) and the an exogenous wealth path
∗
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A p p e n d i x6P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n6
After the shock  (0)  ∗
 (0). Hence there is some time needed until the
optimal number of ﬁrms crosses the already exisiting. If the potential optimal
number is growing with the stationary rate of wealth accumulation we can de-
termine the duration of this adjustment process in which no additional ﬁrms
are ﬁnanced, ˙  =0:
 (0) − ∗
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A p p e n d i x6P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n7






 , the the internal return of
exporting start-ups  (see 17) and the an exogenous wealth path
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 0 for ∞    1
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